IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


Robert A. Neinast

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Columbus
Metropolitan Library, et al.

Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal No. 09AP-349

(Accelerated Calendar)


Trial No. 09 CVH 01-1082



NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure 21(H), Appellant hereby notifies the Court that he wishes to present authorities not cited in his briefs. These authorities have just recently come to the attention of Appellant.

In their brief, Appellees quote State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 324, saying “Any ‘[u]nsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered admitted, * * * and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” The later case, York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (Ohio 1991), clarifies that the enhanced pleading standard of Hickman (via Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E. 2d 753) applies to “few carefully circumscribed cases”. Even the dissent in York understands the standard to be “Unsupported legal conclusions are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, Miller v. Ameritech, No. 00AP-909 (Ohio App. Dist.10 06/05/2001) says that any enhanced pleading standards are limited to a few specific exceptions,

Civ.R. 8(A) provides for notice pleading and requires only “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.” Thus, a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage and need only give reasonable notice of the claim. State ex rel. Harris v. Toledo (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 36. Outside of a few carefully circumscribed exceptions, none of which apply here, in which the Supreme Court has modified the standard for granting a motion to dismiss by requiring that the plaintiff plead operative facts with particularity, see York, supra, at 144, a complaint need not contain more than “brief and sketchy allegations of fact to survive a motion to dismiss under the notice pleading rule.” Id. at 146 (Moyer, C.J., concurring); see, also, Stephens v. Boothby (1974), 40 Ohio App.2d 197, 198 (noting that complaint “must at least state the operative grounds which create a claim, but the relating of facts giving rise to the claims is not necessary”).

(Emphasis added.)

Copies of York and Miller are attached to this Notice.


  Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
Robert A. Neinast
Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se
8617 Ashford Lane
Pickerington, OH 43147
Phone: (614) 759-1601


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served, by regular U.S. mail, upon Richard M. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, 30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor, Columbus, OH, 43215-3428, this 4th day of August, 2009.