Thomas A. Kelly, Attorney at Law, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Stephen D. Walters, Attorney at Law, for Defendant-Appellant

Howard T. Sterling, Asst. Pros. Attorney

BELL, P.J., VICTOR, J., MAHONEY, J., CONCUR

PER CURIAM

This cause was heard June 1, 1979, upon the record in the trial court, including the transcript of proceedings, and the briefs. It was argued by counsel for the parties and submitted to the court. We have reviewed each assignment of error and make the following disposition:

Elizabeth Vasas was, prior to her discharge, an employee of the Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital. The removal order was signed by Mr. Gleen E. Potter, Vice President of Operations. That order was appealed to the State Personnel Board of Review.

The hearing officer considered the matter before him and, rather than ruling on the merits of the claim, he found that the order signed by Mr. Potter was not authorized and, hence, did not effect the discharge of Ms. Vasas. The hearing officer concluded that the Board of County Hospital Trustees constituted the appointing authority for the Hospital; that the resolution of its Board of Trustees did not delegate to Mr. Potter the right to discharge. He also found as a matter of law that the Board of Trustees cannot delegate its power to remove employees to another perons and the order of removal made here is invalid.

The State Personnel Board of Review confirmed the position taken by the hearing officer saying, in part:

"A careful reading of Sec. 339.06 R.C. the enabling statute which created the Board of County Hospital Trustees, we note the following language: 'The Board of County Hospital Trustees shall employ an administrator whose salary and other benefits shall be determined by the Trustees. Upon the nomination by such administrator the board shall confirm the employment of such physician, nurses and other employees * * *.' This statute clearly requires approval of the trustees for employment of personnel and by implication requires approval for removal. There having been no approval by the trustees, the order of removal was not properly promulgated."

This order was appealed to the Common Pleas Court of Lorain County. That court affirmed the decision recited above and the instant appeal was filed.

Of interest is the fact that appellant was given a second order of removal which was forwarded to appellant prior to the ruling of the hearing officer. Apparrently, feeling that such an order was of no consequence legally, appellant did not appeal same. This action now, as can be seen, places her in somewhat of a quandary.

We believe that the matter before us should be reversed and we so order.

The power to remove or suspend an employee of the County Hospital is one subject to delegation. Bell v. Bd. of Trustees, 34 Ohio St. 2d 70 (1970). To rule otherwise would be to constrain unduly the efficient operation of the Board and the facilities over which it presides.

We reverse the judgment below and remand the matter for hearing on the merits of appellants claims.