BRYANT, J.

Appellants Arnold and Marie Joseph and the Hocking Valley Train Station Restaurant appeal from the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment and dismissing their claim under R.C. 735.27 against defendants, Village of Prospect and the Council of the Village of Prospect.

Appellants are the primary shareholders in the Hocking Valley Train Station Restaurant, a duly licensed Ohio corporation. The restaurant is located at 300 Northeast Street in Prospect, Ohio and appellants reside at 322 Northeast Street. Adjacent to and surrounding appellants property is a drainage ditch, known as Idleman's Ditch. Plaintiffs claim that the open portion of Idleman's Ditch that borders their property needs to be "dredged and/or cleaned and the weeds and other foliage need to be cut." Since they contend that the Village of Prospect is solely responsible for the maintenance of the ditch, plaintiffs filed suit against the Village and the Board of Commissioners on October 22, 1993. Plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to meet their statutory obligations under R.C. 735.27 which regulates the care, supervision, and management of public institutions in villages.

Plaintiffs' claim alleged that as a proximate and direct result of defendants 'failure to maintain Idleman's ditch,' damage was caused to plaintiffs' abutting property. Further, plaintiffs' contend that defendants' inaction has caused the Hocking Valley Train Station Restaurant to lose present income as well as future business and goodwill. Because of these alleged damages, plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin defendants from "continued noncompliance with their statutory mandate." Further, plaintiffs requested judgment against defendants in the amount of $ 50,000 as compensation for the damages, plus attorney fees and costs.

On November 1, 1996, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which argued that the claimed breach of statutory duty under R.C. 735.27 does not state a legal cause of action against defendants. In addition, defendants contended that plaintiffs' claim of damages for lost business and income is speculative and without a competent legal basis to allow the case to go to a jury. Finally, defendants submitted the deposition of a Marion County deputy engineer who testified that contrary to plaintiffs' complaints the ditch had adequate flow of water and did not pose a safety hazard.

On December 5, 1996, the Marion County Court of Common Pleas granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claims. It is from this judgment that plaintiffs assert the following assignment of error:

The trial court committed prejudicial error by granting defendant and third party plaintiff's motion for summary judgment when there existed genuine issues of material fact.

The standard for determining when a motion for summary judgment is properly granted pursuant to Civil Rule 56(C) is set forth in Temple v. Wean United Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267, which states:

Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.

The burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact falls upon the moving party in requesting summary judgment. Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 115, 526 N.E.2d 798. Additionally, a motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for which (1) that party bears the burden of production at trial, and (2) for which the moving party has met its initial burden. See Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 35, 623 N.E.2d 591, and Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St. 3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, paragraph three of the syllabus.

Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellant, we find that summary judgment was properly entered for the appellee. R.C. 735.27 imposes a statutory duty for villages to provide for the care, supervision and management of certain public institutions. The statute provides:

The Legislative authority of a village shall provide by resolution or ordinance for the care, supervision and management of all public parks, baths, libraries, market houses, crematories, sewage disposal plants, house of refuge and correction, work houses, infirmaries, hospitals, pest houses or any such institutions owned, maintained or established by such village. When the legislative authority determines to plat any of the streets, it shall provide for the platting thereof.

It is clear that the statute creates a duty to the public at large, not to individual property owners and therefore affords no private right of action.

In Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St. 3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the public duty rule. The rule provides that "when a duty which the law imposes upon a public official is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, it is generally a public and not an individual injury." Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. Recovery for negligent conduct may still be recoverable, however, if the public official's conduct falls within the special duty exception.

A special duty may be indicated where 1) the governmental entity assumes, through promises or actions, an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party; 2) the entity's agents know that inaction could lead to harm; 3) the entity's agents and the injured party have some form of direct contact; and 4) the injured party justifiably relies on the entity's affirmative undertaking. Id., paragraph four of the syllabus.

In the present case, appellants have failed to demonstrate that they have standing under R.C. 735.27. Further, they have failed to establish the necessary elements to sue under the special duty rule and therefore have not satisfied their burden to refute appellees' motion for summary judgment. Since no genuine issue remains to be litigated, and reasonable minds can only come to a conclusion adverse to appellants, appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. We therefore overrule appellants' assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Marion Count Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

EVANS, P.J., and HADLEY, J., concur.