COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OH


Robert A. Neinast
Plaintiff,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library, et. al
Defendants.

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Case No. 04CVH-06-6341

Judge Frye





MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. ARGUMENT

In response to Neinast's Motion For Summary Judgment, Defendants incorporate all arguments they have made thus far as contained in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. Defendants, therefore, seek to highligh only a few points in this Memorandum.

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Neinast makes many factual arguments concerning whether other institutions require shoes or have the authority to require shoes. The authority and prerogative of those institutions, however, are not at issue in this case. The only issue involved here is whether O.R.C. § 3375.40(H) grants the Library the authority to enact a rule requiring its patrons wear shoes. The Defendants have adequately addressed that issue in the briefs filed with this Court to date.

As previously discussed, the Library's shoe requirement is valid so long as it is reasonable and not in clear conflict with the statutory intent of the legislation governing the subject matter. In re Appeal of Buckeye Power, Inc., 42 Ohio St. 2d, 508, 509, 330 N.E.2d 430, 430 (1975); Woodbridge Partners Group, Inc. v. Ohio Lottery Comm., 99 Ohio App. 3d 269, 273, 650 N.E.2d 498, 500-01 (Franklin Cty. 1994). Neinast's factual arguments regarding other institutions could only logically be related to whether the Library's shoe requirement is reasonable. The District Court and Sixth Circuit, however, have already made those determinations, including that the shoe requirment is reasonable, and Neinast is bound to the factual findings by res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 62 Ohio St. 2d 133 (1980).

The only remaining issue then is whether the shoe requirement is in clear conflict with the statutory intent of the legislation governing the subject matter. Since Neinast's factual arguments contained in his Motion For Summary Judgment do not pertain to that issue, they remain irrelevant. And as Defendants have demonstrated, the shoe requirement does not conflict with the legislative intent. As a result, the shoe requirement is valid.

CONCLUSION

For these reason and those cited in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply In Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, Defendants respectfully request this Court to deny Neinast's Motion For Summary Judgment and grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.



  Respectfully submitted,
/s/ P M D     
Philomena M. Dane (0044064)
Heather L. Stutz (0078111)
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P.
1300 Huntington Center
41 South High Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 365-2700

Attorneys for Defendants
Board of Trustees of the Columbus
Metropolitan Library and Patrick A.
Losinski




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was served by regular U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon Robert A. Neinast, Plaintiff, 8617 Ashford Lane, Pickerington, Ohio 43147, this 16th day of May, 2005.


  /s/ P M D     
Philomena M. Dane





Footnotes:

1. Mr. Neinast is bound by collateral estoppel to the federal courts' factual determinations. Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 62 Ohio St. 2d 133; 137, 403 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (1980) ("Where there is identity of parties and of issues, an earlier decision may be used to bar litigation of identical issues in a later case involving a different cause of action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel."). [Back]

2. With respect to the federal courts' determinations of all factual issues, Mr. Neinast is bound by collateral estoppel. Superior's Brand Meats, Inc., at 137, 403 N.E.2d at 1000. [Back]

3. If this Court determines that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are not barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, Defendants reserve the right to brief those claims in their entirety. [Back]

4. Mr. Neinast's status as a pro se litigant has no bearing on whether his claims are res judicata. See Musa v. Gillett Communs., 119 Ohio App. 3d 673, 683-84 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1997) (a plaintiff's pro se status "provides no basis for relief. . . . [A] pro se litigant is bound by the same rules of law, including the law of preclusion, as those who are represented by counsel."). [Back]